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OCASIO V. UNITED STATES: THE SCOPE 
OF A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT HOBBS 
ACT EXTORTION 
BENJAMIN LUDEWIG* 
INTRODUCTION 
Ocasio v. United States1 presents the question of whether a conviction 
under the general federal conspiracy statute2 may be based on Hobbs Act 
extortion3 when a public official defendant has formed an agreement to 
obtain property from someone within the conspiracy. 4  The Hobbs Act 
provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, 
delays, or affects commerce . . . by . . . extortion . . . in furtherance of a 
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be” guilty 
of an offense against the United States.5 The Act defines “extortion” as “the 
obtaining of property from another, with his consent . . . under color of 
official right.”6 
There is currently a circuit split on the question presented in Ocasio v. 
United States. 7  The Sixth Circuit interpreted the Hobbs Act’s language 
definition of extortion as the “obtaining of property from another”8 and 
concluded that a Hobbs Act conspiracy requires an agreement to obtain 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2017.
1. No. 14-361 (U.S. argued Oct. 6, 2015).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (“If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for 
any purpose, and one or more of such person do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”). 
3. See infra Section II.A.
4. Brief for the United States at i, United States v. Ocasio, 135 S. Ct. 1491 (2015) (No. 14-361)
[hereinafter Government Brief]. 
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012).
6. Id. § 1951(b)(2).
7. See infra Section II.B (detailing the split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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property from someone outside the conspiracy. 9  The Fourth Circuit 
disagreed, holding that a Hobbs Act conspiracy does not require an 
agreement to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy when 
the conduct of the co-conspirator providing property to the public official 
rises to the level of “active solicitation and procurement”10 instead of just 
“mere acquiescence.”11 
In Ocasio v. United States, the Supreme Court will address this circuit 
split. This commentary details the relevant facts and procedural history of 
the case, the legal background of the Hobbs Act, and how courts have 
treated general federal conspiracies to commit Hobbs Act extortion. It then 
lays out the arguments presented by both Ocasio and the U.S. government. 
After analyzing these arguments in light of the governing law, it concludes 
that the Court should affirm the Fourth Circuit’s holding and allow that a 
conviction under the general federal conspiracy statute be based on Hobbs 
Act extortion when the property is obtained from someone within the 
conspiracy. This holding is consistent with the text of the Hobbs Act and 
prevents adverse policy consequences by denying an exemption for broader 
conspiracies. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The prosecutions underlying this case were the result of a nearly two-
year investigation by the Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”) and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 12  The investigation uncovered a wide-
ranging “kickback” scheme involving the Majestic Auto Repair Shop LLC 
(“Majestic”) and over fifty BPD officers.13 Under the scheme, BPD officers 
would refer automobile accident victims to Majestic for automobile repair 
work.14 In exchange for each referral, the officers would receive a monetary 
payment from Herman Moreno and Edwin Mejia (the co-owners and 
operators of Majestic) ranging from $150 to $300 per vehicle.15 After the 
kickback scheme began in either late 2008 or early 2009, knowledge of it 
spread throughout the BPD by word of mouth.16 
	  
 9.  United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 767 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 10.  United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1277 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 11.  Id. at 1276. 
 12.  United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 13.  Id. at 401, 403. 
 14.  Id. at 403. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 403–04. 
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Petitioner Samuel Ocasio, an officer for the BPD, first became involved 
in the conspiracy around May 2009.17 From May 2009 until 2011, Ocasio 
referred numerous vehicles to Majestic and received a cash payment of 
$300 on each occasion.18 Consistent with Moreno’s instructions, Ocasio 
would call Moreno from the scenes of automobile accidents and describe 
the damaged vehicles.19 If Moreno decided he wanted the vehicle, Ocasio 
would convince the driver to use Majestic’s services and arrange for the 
wrecked vehicle to be towed to Majestic.20 On one occasion, in January 
2010, Ocasio went as far as convincing a driver to cancel a AAA request 
that the driver had already made and have the car towed to Majestic 
instead.21 On another occasion, Ocasio misrepresented the condition of a 
2006 Toyota to its owner after it had been hit by another car while parked, 
advising the owner to have the car towed to Majestic even though it was in 
an operable condition.22 
Ocasio also used Majestic’s services for his personal needs.23 In 2010, 
Ocasio’s wife was involved in a traffic accident that caused damage to the 
rear bumper that was likely too minor to be covered by Ocasio’s insurance 
company.24 Ocasio had the car towed to Majestic, overstated the SUV’s 
damage on an insurance claim form, and had Moreno cause additional 
damage to the SUV consistent with the damage description reported by 
Ocasio.25 In addition to the standard cash referral fee, Majestic paid the 
additional fees not covered by Ocasio’s insurance company. 26  Moreno 
admitted at trial that he did this in an effort to foster good will with Ocasio, 
hoping to ensure Ocasio would continue making referrals.27 
In March of 2011, Ocasio, Moreno, Mejia, and eight BPD officers were 
indicted in the Federal District Court of Maryland in connection with the 
kickback scheme.28 The initial indictment alleged, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
371, 29  that the defendants “conspired to violate the Hobbs Act . . . by 
	  
 17.  Id. at 404. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 405. 
 23.  Id. at 406. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 401–02. 
 29.  18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
LUDEWIG	  FINAL	  READ_PK.DOCX	  (DO	  NOT	  DELETE)	   5/11/16	  	  4:01	  PM	  
2016] THE SCOPE OF A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT HOBBS ACT EXTORTION 259 
agreeing to ‘unlawfully obtain under color of official right, money and 
other property’ from Moreno, Mejia and Majestic.” 30  The conspiracy 
offense in the initial indictment was dismissed as to ten of the eleven co-
defendants in exchange for guilty pleas.31 Moreno and Mejia each pleaded 
guilty to Hobbs Act extortion and conspiracy. 32  In October of 2011, a 
seven-count superseding indictment was returned by the grand jury 
charging Ocasio and Kevin Manrich, another BPD officer. 33  The 
superseding indictment repeated the 18 U.S.C. § 371 charge of conspiring 
to violate the Hobbs Act and charged both with Hobbs Act extortion of 
Moreno.34 
At trial, Ocasio relied on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Brock and argued that he could not be convicted of conspiring with Moreno 
and Mejia because they were the victims of the alleged Hobbs Act extortion 
conspiracy.35 The district court rejected this argument, concluding that the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Spitler controlled.36 The jury 
found Ocasio guilty of all charges against him, and the district court 
sentenced Ocasio to eighteen months in prison.37 The court also ordered 
Ocasio to make restitution to the BPD for the aggregate value of the cash 
payments he received from Majestic and to pay back $1,870 to the 
insurance company for the at-fault driver involved in the accident with his 
wife.38 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that Spitler 
controlled.39 The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling in part but 
reversed the district court’s order for restitution payments to the insurance 
company.40 The court held that Moreno and Mejia could be named and 
prosecuted as co-conspirators, even though they were the purported victims 
of the conspiratorial agreement, because they actively participated in the 
conspiratorial scheme.41  The court declined to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s 
	  
 30.  Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 402. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See id. at 407. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 410. 
 40.  Id. at 412 (quoting United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 1996)). 
 41.  See id. 
LUDEWIG	  FINAL	  READ_PK.DOCX	  (DO	  NOT	  DELETE)	   5/11/16	  	  4:01	  PM	  
260 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 11 
interpretation of the Hobbs Act, instead holding that the “from another” 
requirement42 does not necessarily refer to a person or entity outside of the 
conspiratorial scheme.43  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Hobbs Act 
The Hobbs Act was passed in 1948 as an amendment to the 1934 Anti-
Racketeering Act.44 The amendment was a direct response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Local 807 of International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, a decision that many in Congress believed was inconsistent 
with the intended purpose of the Anti-Racketeering Act.45 The Hobbs Act 
punishes by fine or imprisonment anyone: 
who[] in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or 
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or 
extortion or attempts to conspire to do so, or commits or threatens 
physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or 
purpose to do anything in violation of this section.46 
The Hobbs Act defines extortion as “the obtaining of property from 
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened 
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”47 
B.  The Circuit Split 
The Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Spitler in 1985.48 Spitler 
was an employee of a state contractor and gave his associates permission to 
accede to the demands of a state highway official for firearms, jewelry, and 
other valuable items in exchange for the approval of inflated invoices.49 For 
	  
 42.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012). 
 43.  See Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 411. 
 44.  See Matthew T. Grady, Extortion May No Longer Mean Extortion After Scheidler v. National 
Organization for Women, Inc., 81 N.D. L. REV. 33, 37 (2005) (citing 91 CONG. REC. 11,911 (1945) 
(statement of Rep. Jennings) (“Congress altered the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act to strengthen and 
clarify its provisions in response to the decision by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Local 807 International Brotherhood of Teamsters.”)). 
 45.  See id.; see also United States v. Local 807 of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942) 
(finding no liability for various New York City union members for extorting property from out-of-state 
truck drivers because there was an exception in the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act that created an 
exemption when the money was paid as part of a valid employment arrangement). 
 46.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012). 
 47.  Id. § 1951(b)(2). 
 48.  See United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 49.  See United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, 409 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Spitler, 800 F.2d at 
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this, Spitler was convicted under the Hobbs Act of conspiracy with a state 
highway official to extort money and property from his employer.50 The 
Fourth Circuit held that, as a matter of law, a person could be convicted as 
a conspirator under the Hobbs Act even when he or she is purpotedly the 
victim of the public official’s extortion.51 The court reasoned that Spitler 
did not “mere[ly] acquiesce[]” in the scheme but, instead, found that 
Spitler’s conduct constituted a “far more active role” as Spitler had 
“induced, procured, caused, and aided” the public official’s ongoing 
extortion.52 The court found there was enough on the record to determine 
that Spitler’s conduct rose above mere acquiescence but found it 
unnecessary to fashion a bright-line rule.53 
The Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Brock in 2007. 54  Brock 
operated a bail bond business with his brother and conducted a scheme 
with a county clerk over several years.55 Under the scheme, Brock would 
pay the clerk to alter the bond schedule by removing scheduled forfeiture 
hearings when one of Brock’s clients skipped town.56 Despite the fact that 
Brock initiated the scheme with the county clerk, the court held that Brock 
could not be a co-conspirator because he was the “victim” of the clerk’s 
extortion scheme.57 The Sixth Circuit focused its opinion on the text of the 
Hobbs Act, reasoning that because the text requires that the agreement must 
be to obtain “property from another,” the “other” must be someone outside 
the conspiracy.58 The court also noted the text “requires the conspirators to 
obtain that property with the other’s consent,” and did not believe it 
possible for someone to conspire to obtain his or her own consent. 59 
Although the court acknowledged the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Spitler, 
the court held that Spitler did not control because it did not believe the 
Fourth Circuit properly considered the “textual anomalies” of the Hobbs 
Act.60 
	  
1278–79). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 409 (citing Spitler, 800 F.2d at 1275). 
 52.  Id. (citing Spitler, 800 F.2d at 1278). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 55.  Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 410 (citing Brock, 501 F.3d at 765). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 410 (citing Brock, 501 F.3d at 767). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See id. at 410 (citing United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 769 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
LUDEWIG	  FINAL	  READ_PK.DOCX	  (DO	  NOT	  DELETE)	   5/11/16	  	  4:01	  PM	  
262 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 11 
In United States v. Ocasio, the Fourth Circuit declined to follow the 
Sixth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Brock.61 The court reasoned that 
the language of the Hobbs Act does not compel the conclusion that a co-
conspirator must obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy.62 
Instead, the Fourth Circuit held that nothing in the text of the Hobbs Act 
foreclosed the possibility that the person being extorted can also be a co-
conspirator of the public official.63 The court held that the Hobbs Act’s 
“from another” requirement provides only that the prosecution must show 
that the object of the conspiracy was for the conspiring public official to 
extort property from someone other than him or herself.64 
III.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Arguments for Ocasio 
Ocasio’s argument relies heavily on the plain text of the Hobbs Act.65 
Ocasio reasons that no English speaker would say that one person who has 
agreed to pay another a bribe “ha[s] agreed to ‘obtain property from 
another with his consent.’” 66  Ocasio supports this by arguing that the 
agreement does not involve “another,” just the two parties making the 
transaction, and that nobody could conspire to obtain his or her own 
consent.67 Ocasio argues that reading the “from another” language in § 
1951(b)(2) as “provid[ing] only that a public official cannot extort 
himself,”68 is absurd because it is a “metaphysical impossibility” to pay a 
bribe to oneself with one’s own money.69 
Ocasio further contends that the Fourth Circuit’s reading of the Hobbs 
Act would classify every payment of a bribe as a criminal conspiracy and, 
in turn, effectively transform the Hobbs Act into a prohibition on paying 
bribes to public officials. 70  Ocasio points out that Congress normally 
chooses to punish bribes directly, citing several federal statutes 
criminalizing paying bribes, and argues that Congress would have punished 
	  
 61.  Id. at 412. 
 62.  Id. at 411. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, United States v. Ocasio, No. 14-361 (Sept. 25, 2015) 
[hereinafter Petition for Certiorari]. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 14. 
 68.  Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 411. 
 69.  See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 65, at 14. 
 70.  Id. at 14–15 (citing United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 768 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
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giving bribes directly here if that is what it intended to do.71 
Ocasio characterizes the distinction the Fourth Circuit makes between 
mere acquiescence and active participation in Spitler and Ocasio as an ad-
hoc standard that borders on being unconstitutionally vague. 72  Ocasio 
believes that the standard’s vagueness essentially gives triers of fact an 
implicit license to find a conspiracy whenever they think the payor is 
generally a wrongdoer and to, alternatively, shield the payor from liability 
when they think he is not.73 
B.  Arguments for the Government 
The government maintains that the Fourth Circuit correctly held the 
Hobbs Act’s use of “from another” refers to property belonging to anyone 
other than the official. 74  The government argues that Ocasio’s textual 
argument is based on the mistaken assumption that all conspirators must 
agree to commit every element of the crime. 75  The general federal 
conspiracy statute76 covers “two or more people who join forces to obtain 
an objective that the law forbids, [when] ‘one or more of [them] do any act 
to effect the object of the conspiracy.’”77 The government contends that, 
because all participants agreed that police officers would perform official 
acts in order to obtain property from someone other than a public official, it 
did not matter that each member of the conspiracy did not satisfy each 
element of the substantive offense.78 Instead, the government argues that all 
that was required was an agreement with an unlawful purpose and an overt 
act in furtherance of the agreement.79 
	  
 71.  Id. at 15. 
 72.  Id. at 15–17. 
 73.  Id. at 17. 
 74.  See Government Brief, supra note 4, at 21 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 48 (10th ed. 1993) (defining “another” to mean, inter alia, “different or distinct from the 
one first considered”)). 
 75.  See Government Brief, supra note 4, at 11 (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 
(1997) (“A conspirator [need] not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive 
offense.”)). 
 76.  18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
 77.  Government Brief, supra note 4, at 15 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012)). 
 78.  See Government Brief, supra note 4, at 12, 15. 
 79.  See id. at 15–20 (arguing that the first element, the agreement, was satisfied by Ocasio’s 
agreement with Baltimore Police Department officers and with Moreno and Mejia to create and 
continue the kickback scheme, and noting that the second element, an overt act, is not seriously 
disputed as Ocasio, Moreno, and Mejia took a number of steps to effectuate the object of the 
agreement). The government further argues that Ocasio’s interpretation of the Hobbs Act could not be 
correct because it would allow a narrower conspiracy involving fewer participants to receive criminal 
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The government rejects Ocasio’s claim that its reading of the Hobbs 
Act would encompass every act of a public official receiving a bribe.80 The 
government believes Ocasio is misguided because the text’s use of 
“consent” in the context of extortion simply means that property changed 
hands under conditions that do not amount to robbery, a lower bar than a 
conspiratorial agreement.81 
Additionally, the government responds to Ocasio’s refutation of the 
Fourth Circuit’s “active participation” 82  requirement by emphasizing its 
deep roots in the Supreme Court’s conspiracy case law.83 The government 
notes that, for decades, lower courts have permitted bribe-payors to face 
accomplice liability under Hobbs Act extortion for actively participating in 
bribery schemes. 84  The government subsequently concludes that the 
distinction between mere acquiescence and active participation could not 
be too vague or unworkable because triers of fact have been applying it for 
decades and Ocasio presents no evidence that juries or judges have 
struggled to apply it.85 
IV.  ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
Ocasio v. United States turns on whether the Court believes the text of 
the Hobbs Act, specifically its use of the “from another” language, 
prohibits a trier of fact from finding a federal conspiracy to commit Hobbs 
Act extortion when the property is obtained from someone within the 
conspiracy.86 The Court should: (1) affirm the Fourth Circuit’s holding and 
rule that a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion does not require that 
the property be obtained from someone outside of the conspiracy, and (2) 
provide guidance on the distinction between “mere acquiescence” and 
“active participation” in the context of Hobbs Act extortion. 
	  
punishment while exempting a broader one involving more participants. See id. at 12. 
 80.  See id. at 32. 
 81.  See id. at 31–32 (arguing that, where the payor is simply complying with an official demand, 
no conspiracy can occur). 
 82.  See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 65, at 15–17. 
 83.  See id. at 33–39; see also id. at 34 (citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932) 
(holding that, in order for a conspiracy to exist, a person’s role in a crime must be more active than 
mere agreement)). 
 84.  Id. at 36–37. 
 85.  Id. at 37–38. The government also discusses the Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. United 
States, which “found no reason to ‘doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a 
qualitative standard to real-world conduct.’” Id. at 38 (citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015)). 
 86.  See supra Part II (providing the legal background of the question presented). 
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The Court should begin its analysis by looking at 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 
its general conspiracy jurisprudence. To prove a federal criminal 
conspiracy, the prosecution must prove the existence of four elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt: an agreement to commit an unlawful act, an 
illegal goal, knowing participation, and an overt act to further the 
conspiracy.87 The text does not require that every member of a conspiracy 
commit the underlying offenses, but only that “one or more of such persons 
do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.”88 Here, there was an 
agreement that Moreno and Mejia would pay BPD officers for referrals as 
part of the scheme. 89  Moreno, Mejia, Ocasio and other BPD officers 
participated with knowledge that the agreement existed, and all relevant 
parties made overt acts to further the scheme. 90  Ocasio satisfied the 
necessary test to prove a federal criminal conspiracy by agreeing to receive 
and by actually receiving money from Moreno. Ocasio does not contest 
that he committed the substantive Hobbs Act offense by receiving money 
from Moreno.91 Thus, he is essentially arguing that, by participating in the 
scheme, Moreno can no longer count as “another” under the Hobbs Act. 
This interpretation is inconsistent with general conspiracy principles, which 
do not require every member of a conspiratorial agreement to commit each 
element of the substantive offense. Thus, the Fourth Circuit was correct in 
its holding that the Hobbs Act’s use of “from another” in its definition of 
extortion only refers to someone other than the public official.92 
Additionally, there are policy implications that weigh heavily against 
Ocasio’s arguments. The rationale often given to justify the existence of 
federal criminal conspiracy law is the widely held belief that joint criminal 
action is more dangerous, and thus poses a greater threat to society, than 
individual criminal action.93  As the government argues in its brief, 94  to 
accept Ocasio’s interpretation of the rule is to create a shield for broader 
conspiracies while still criminalizing conspiracies of the same sort with 
	  
 87.  Jesse Winograd, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 611, 614 (2004). 
 88.  See id. at 611 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012)). 
 89.  See supra Part I (providing factual background underlying charges against Ocasio). 
 90.  See id. 
 91.  See generally Petition for Certiorari, supra note 65. Notably, Ocasio does not seek to overturn 
the trier of fact’s fact-finding, but instead is appealing the controlling legal standard. 
 92.  See United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, 411 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 93.  See, e.g., Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever 
Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3–4 (1992) (noting that this 
rationale has been fully accepted on many occasions by judges, including the Supreme Court, and 
practicing lawyers throughout the United States). 
 94.  See Government Brief, supra note 4, at 12. 
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narrower scopes of involvement. If the government had been unable to 
prove Moreno and Mejia were involved in the agreement, the government 
would still have had enough evidence to prove a general conspiracy to 
commit Hobbs Act extortion. Ocasio should not be able to escape liability 
simply because the government was able to prove that the conspiratorial 
scheme was even broader, involving Moreno and Mejia. This interpretation 
is inconsistent with the rationale behind federal criminal conspiracy law, a 
body of law premised on the belief that joint criminal action poses a greater 
societal threat than individual criminal action. 95  Accepting this holding 
would incentivize public officials conspiring to commit Hobbs Act 
extortion to broaden the conspiratorial agreement and solicit participation 
in the scheme from the people they are obtaining property from in an effort 
to shield themselves from liability. A holding that incentivizes the 
participation of more actors in a criminal scheme is inconsistent with 
federal conspiracy law. 
Although the Court should side with the government and affirm the 
Fourth Circuit’s holding, Ocasio raises a strong argument about the 
vagueness of the “mere participation” versus “active participation” 
distinction in the context of Hobbs Act extortion. 96  However, this 
distinction has been used in the Court’s conspiracy jurisprudence for 
years.97 But in the context of a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion, 
the application of this standard may leave room for unnecessary judicial 
activism or at least the appearance of judicial activism. For example, 
looking to this set of facts, it is hard to imagine how any involvement by 
Moreno and Mejia could have been classified as simply “mere 
acquiescence.” Even if the BPD officers had been the ones who solicited 
the scheme, Majestic’s agreement to pay $300 for the illegal referrals could 
be characterized as either active participation or mere acquiescence. 
Although the potential benefits of a standard that affords a trier of fact 
some degree of flexibility are clear, a standard that allows for too much 
flexibility may threaten to undermine the credibility and perceived 
legitimacy of the common law process.98 Even if the trier of fact believes it 
is arriving at a conclusion through a decision-making process bound by a 
stringent legal standard, without transparency the appearance of judicial 
	  
 95.  See Marcus, supra note 93, at 3–4. 
 96.  See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 65, at 15–17. 
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activism can have the same adverse consequences. In the interest of judicial 
administration, the Court should provide some guidance on the distinction 
between “active participation” and “mere acquiescence” in the context of 
Hobbs Act extortion to avoid unnecessarily creating a license for judicial 
activism or the appearance of judicial activism. 
CONCLUSION 
In Ocasio v. United States, the Court will address a split between the 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits on the scope of a conspiracy to commit Hobbs 
Act extortion. The Court should hold for the government and affirm the 
Fourth Circuit’s holding. The government’s arguments are most consistent 
with the text of the Hobbs Act and adopting the government’s position 
would prevent adverse policy consequences that would deny protection for 
broader conspiracies. 
 
